The Strait of Hormuz’s tit-for-tat at sea will remain endemic

JUNE 28 — A ceasefire on paper is not a ceasefire at sea.

Problems on land between the US and Iran invariably produce new problems at sea. Political understandings signed in capitals may reduce the probability of immediate escalation, but they rarely eliminate the operational realities faced by naval commanders, drone operators and commercial shipping companies navigating one of the world’s most contested waterways.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the clearest example of this enduring dilemma.

Through this narrow maritime corridor passes roughly one-fifth of the world’s seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas exports. The real question is therefore not whether Washington and Tehran can reach a memorandum of understanding or announce another ceasefire arrangement.

The more difficult question is whether anyone can actually enforce it once ships are moving, commanders are improvising, and drones are already in the air.

The sea obeys a different logic from diplomacy.

Political leaders can announce understandings and memoranda. Foreign ministers can issue communiqués and celebrate diplomatic breakthroughs. Yet tankers, container vessels and LNG carriers must continue operating in waters where decisions are made not by negotiators in capitals but by naval officers, radar operators, drone pilots and commercial captains working under severe pressure and incomplete information.

This explains why warnings issued by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards continue to matter so profoundly.

When Tehran insists that vessels must utilise only approved routes, it is not merely discussing navigation procedures. It is asserting jurisdictional authority and operational control over one of the world’s most important maritime arteries.

When commercial vessels are subsequently struck or threatened while Washington and Tehran exchange accusations and promises of retaliation, the message becomes unmistakable.

The Strait of Hormuz remains a theatre of coercion rather than a settled corridor of peace.

The danger becomes even greater when retaliation expands beyond the immediate parties involved. Iran possesses the capability to respond asymmetrically through proxies, affiliated militias or indirect pressure on neighbouring states and shipping networks. Gulf Cooperation Council states may become targets not because they initiated hostilities but because of their strategic proximity to American military infrastructure and logistics arrangements.

As history repeatedly demonstrates, geography often determines vulnerability more than political intent.

This is precisely what makes tit-for-tat exchanges so difficult to contain.

First, there is no single maritime authority in the Strait of Hormuz.

Political leaders may sign understandings, but maritime rules are interpreted by multiple institutions with overlapping responsibilities and contradictory incentives. A commercial vessel may receive one instruction from diplomats, another from insurers, a third from port authorities and a fourth from naval patrols.

That is not maritime governance.

It is strategic ambiguity disguised as order.

Second, diplomatic agreements themselves often preserve uncertainty deliberately.

References to “future administration”, “mutual understandings” or “appropriate arrangements” may sound constructive, yet ambiguity invites contestation. Who determines lawful transit? Who authorises deviations? Who investigates incidents? Who possesses enforcement authority?

The less precise the answers become, the easier it is for all parties to claim compliance while simultaneously accusing others of violations.

Third, coercion in confined maritime spaces is remarkably inexpensive.

A drone overflight, a suspected mine warning, electronic jamming, GPS spoofing or aggressive manoeuvring by fast attack craft can generate significant strategic effects without crossing the threshold into conventional warfare.

Such actions create pressure without demanding escalation.

Yet once calibrated harassment becomes routine, restraint itself starts to appear politically costly.

Fourth, attribution is slow while retaliation is often immediate.

Maritime incidents unfold within minutes while investigations may require weeks. Was an attack conducted by Iranian drones, a proxy militia, an unauthorised actor or a third party seeking escalation? Was electronic interference deliberate or accidental?

In the interval between incident and attribution, political narratives frequently outrun evidence.

The first casualty at sea is often certainty.

Fifth, shipping remains fundamentally a commercial rather than military ecosystem.

Shipowners, charterers, underwriters, insurers, financiers and compliance officers all calculate risk differently. Governments may promise safe passage, but commercial operators remain concerned about sanctions exposure, legal liabilities, insurance premiums and crew safety.

Markets react faster than diplomacy.

Sixth, sanctions continue to complicate navigation.

Even if Tehran provides assurances regarding maritime safety, many shipping firms remain reluctant to engage closely with Iranian authorities for fear that such cooperation may later be interpreted as sanctionable conduct.

Commercial hesitation can become almost as disruptive as military confrontation itself.

Seventh, the region contains actors with profoundly different appetites for risk.

Some seek stability.

Others seek leverage.

Others seek revenge, deterrence or domestic political advantage.

Under such conditions, a single incident can trigger several different responses simultaneously, each moving faster than diplomacy and less predictably than deterrence.

Eighth, maritime decision-making occurs in minutes rather than days.

A slight course adjustment may appear provocative. A radio warning may sound threatening. Defensive manoeuvres can easily be interpreted as offensive intent.

In narrow waterways, geography magnifies misunderstanding.

Ninth, ambiguity itself possesses strategic value.

Iran benefits from maintaining a strait that remains neither fully open nor formally closed. External powers may similarly prefer ambiguity to arrangements that openly legitimise Iranian authority over international navigation.

When uncertainty serves all sides politically, clarity becomes difficult to achieve.

Tenth, and most importantly, a memorandum is not a mechanism.

Agreements cannot investigate incidents, escort tankers or reassure markets in real time. Stability requires institutions, procedures, communication channels and verification systems rather than declarations alone.

Yet there is an eleventh lesson that deserves equal attention.

Modern maritime security increasingly depends upon information superiority rather than firepower superiority.

Without comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness, governments are effectively navigating blind.

The ability to distinguish fishing vessels from surveillance platforms, commercial drones from military drones and routine movements from hostile intent increasingly determines whether crises escalate or dissipate.

Satellites, unmanned systems, integrated radar networks and real-time information sharing are becoming as important as frigates, submarines and destroyers.

This lesson extends far beyond the Gulf.

For countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the implications are immediate.

If uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz can destabilise global energy markets within hours, similar vulnerabilities exist in the Strait of Malacca, the Singapore Strait and the approaches to the South China Sea.

A single drone attack, an unidentified vessel or electronic interference can disrupt arrangements painstakingly negotiated by diplomats and political leaders.

This is precisely what events in the Strait of Hormuz continue to demonstrate.

No country can guarantee that these waterways are absolutely safe.

What governments can do is make them more transparent, predictable and resilient.

This requires deeper cooperation in maritime surveillance, fusion centres, artificial intelligence-enabled tracking systems and information sharing among regional coast guards, navies and port authorities.

Maritime Domain Awareness should no longer be viewed as merely a technical issue.

It has become an economic necessity and a strategic imperative.

The insurance dimension is equally important.

Shipping insurers price uncertainty ruthlessly.

Every drone attack, mine warning, missile launch or intercepted communication raises premiums.

Higher insurance premiums eventually become higher transportation costs, higher energy prices and ultimately higher inflation throughout Asia.

The costs of maritime insecurity are therefore paid not merely by shipowners but by households purchasing electricity, fuel and food.

Even more fundamentally, the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates the limits of military superiority in narrow seas.

Aircraft carriers and advanced combat aircraft remain formidable instruments of power, yet geography imposes constraints that technology alone cannot overcome.

Small drones, mobile missile launchers, underwater mines and inexpensive fast attack craft can challenge vastly superior naval forces operating within confined waters.

This asymmetry explains why deterrence in maritime chokepoints remains difficult and escalation management even harder.

If the objective is to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, rhetoric alone will not suffice.

What is required is painstaking institutional work: unified transit protocols, direct naval hotlines, rapid attribution mechanisms, transparent reporting systems and practical safeguards that make lawful passage safer and more profitable than coercion.

Without such mechanisms, the strait will remain what it has too often been throughout history: a place where every warning is also a threat, every signal can be misread and every misunderstanding risks becoming the next strike.

The ceasefire may have halted the war.

It has not yet secured the sea.

For that reason, complete peace in the Strait of Hormuz, even under the framework of a memorandum of understanding, will remain elusive for the foreseeable future.

Tit-for-tat exchanges at sea are therefore unlikely to disappear.

They may simply become more calibrated, more technological and more difficult to attribute.

That may make them less visible than war.

It does not make them less dangerous.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies and director, Institute of Internationalisation and Asean Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia. 

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.